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Abstract 
Card-based partnerships between banks and retailers 
have created new opportunities for profit enhancement. We 
use public data, together with proprietary data from a fi-
nancial institution to examine the impact of card-based 
promotions on consumer behavior and merchant perfor-
mance. The results show that card promotions are associ-
ated with increasing customer traffic and transactions from 
the bank for its merchant partners. We also found signifi-
cant variation among offer sizes, types, as well as merchant 
and consumer segments. Our research creates valuable 
insights and paves the way forward for decision support.  
1. Introduction  
Card products are getting ever more sophisticated 
and have a mix of hard and soft benefits, including 
rewards and cash rebates from co-branded loyalty 
programs, and long-term promotions with retail mer-
chants. Well-designed card programs enable banks to 
grow targeted customer bases, achieve more mer-
chant purchases and revenues, improve customer 
benefits and brand awareness [2], and result in a win-
win-win outcome [12].  
Banks also face fierce competition. Some issuers 
have learned through failures that an inefficient pro-
gram may not succeed even after its costs have been 
reduced [5]. Hence, banks must figure out whether 
the bundled benefits with a credit card can drive in-
creasing revenue from the merchant partner based on 
leveraging consumer preferences in a way that cre-
ates customer centricity.  
Research on card programs in financial services, 
and loyalty programs, coupons and price promotions 
in other industries has grown, showcasing perspec-
tives of academic strategists and data analytics spe-
cialists. Our work contributes by combining anony-
mized customer transaction data with public data to 
investigate the impact of card-based promotions on 
consumer behavior and merchant performance.  
We answer these questions: (1) What are the ef-
fects of card-based promotions on merchant sales and 
consumer purchases through credit cards? (2) Do 
these promotions drive more customer traffic and 
transactions with merchant partners from bank cus-
tomers? (3) How do the effects vary for promotion 
size and type, across merchant and customer seg-
ments? 
We focus on the market of an Asian country and 
study a popular and transparent business sector, 
which enabled us to collect merchant data from an 
online aggregator. We acquired other data, such as 
credit card offers from the websites of various banks, 
and anonymized data on transactions and customers 
from a financial institution. By consolidating the data 
with a fuzzy matching algorithm, we were able to 
construct a panel dataset for model estimation. 
Our results show positive impacts of card promo-
tions on customer traffic and transaction volume. 
However, the influence on merchant sales is unclear. 
We also found varied effects of card promotions 
among offer sizes and types, as well as for different 
merchant and customer segments. Our work offers 
new knowledge about credit card programs and paves 
the way forward for decision support in banks to 
more deeply probe credit card customer rewards and 
loyalty program behavior.  
2. Related Literature 
We will discuss prior studies on credit card re-
wards, loyalty programs, and price promotions in 
Finance, Marketing and Information Systems (IS).  
2.1. Card Rewards in Financial Services 
Research related to credit card rewards has inves-
tigated a variety of issues, including biased consumer 
preferences, redemption behavior, and customer loy-
alty [7, 9, 11, 13]. Studies relevant to this research 
have looked into the impacts of card programs on 
consumer buying behavior.  
Wirtz et al. [21] examined the impact of card loy-
alty programs on wallet share and suggested that at-
tractive reward programs are likely to increase credit 
card usage. Ching and Hayashi [6] found through 
unique empirical research that consumers were will-
ing to switch to cash and checks for in-store pay-
ments if card rewards were removed. However, few 
past works have systematically quantified the effects 
of such programs.  
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2.2. Loyalty Programs in Other Industries 
Loyalty program studies have been conducted in 
other contexts such as airlines, hotels, and supermar-
kets. It is widely accepted in Marketing literature that 
loyalty programs are profitable for firms [1, 7, 15]. 
An example is Kopalle et al. [10], who used data 
from a major hotel chain and found that the reward 
frequency and customer-tier components of a loyalty 
program contribute to incremental sales. In the same 
context, Wang et al. [20] launched a large-scale field 
experiment and identified increased consumer buying 
behavior due to loyalty promotions.  
Some research suggests otherwise: that loyalty 
programs are not always producing. Gupta and Leh-
mann [8] demonstrated that a number of companies 
invest large amounts of money in loyalty manage-
ment but receive few tangible profits. Villenueva et 
al. [19] argued that increased price competition may 
cause lower profits when firms focus on long-term 
profit maximization in loyalty programs.  
2.3. Price Discounts and Promotion Types 
There are numerous empirical studies on coupons, 
price discounts, and other promotion types, that have 
explored the market responses and dynamics of dif-
ferent promotion sizes and types, and optimal com-
peting strategies for retailers. Neslin [14] estimated a 
market response model using retailer scanner data 
and revealed the effects of couponing on market 
shares. Subramanian and Rao [18] developed a theo-
retical model, which shows that displaying sales on 
websites can transform the cannibalization of mer-
chant revenues into an advantage and improve cus-
tomer acquisition. In contrast, Simonson et al. [17] 
and Anderson [3] both suggested that sales promo-
tions sometimes serve as adverse signals of product 
quality, resulting in negative impacts on consumer-
buying decisions.  
Loyalty programs in financial services, especially 
credit card programs, differ from those in other in-
dustries though. First, typical loyalty programs in 
retailing are created for a single company, but card 
promotions often involve multiple stakeholders in the 
same market. Second, unlike firms in the hospitality, 
air travel and retailing areas, banks usually have larg-
er and more long-lived customer bases that exhibit 
higher variation in their preferences. Third, credit 
card programs offer several types of promotions, in-
cluding rewards, cash rebates, and price discounts 
simultaneously. So the research gap in promotion-
related research between financial services and other 
industries encourages our exploratory work supported 
by unique data. 
 
3. Data Description and Research Context 
Our research site involves the credit card market 
in an Asian country, with a focus on one of the most 
active and vibrant competitive sectors in the country. 
We next explain how we built a dataset for empirical 
analysis by consolidating data from multiple sources 
and applying machine-based data analytics prior to 
our implementation of explanatory econometrics. 
3.1. Credit Card Offers from Banks 
By collecting credit card offers from webpages of 
4 leading banks (I, II, III and IV), we acquired obser-
vations from September to December 2015, including 
the merchant partner names and offer descriptions. 
Summary statistics for card offers are in Fig. 1.  
Fig. 1. Credit card offers of the 4 banks 
 
The banks enrolled many merchant partners each: 
I (70), II (72), III (122) and IV (144). They arranged 
many deals for the various outlets of the merchants, 
leading to numerous card-based offers: I (163), II 
(400), III (189), and IV (407). Most merchants gave a 
10% discount, while others offered 15% to 20%. 
Other deals included: one-paid-one-free, special in-
stant rebates, and complementary goods. 
3.2. Merchants in the Local Market 
We collected merchant data from a popular online 
aggregator with a special focus on the business sector 
that we investigated. It covers 100,000+ merchants, 
from which we obtained review data on 9,811 of the 
most popular ones. Useful attributes include mer-
chant name, zipcode location, perceived quality 
score, number of votes, price levels, service type, and 
other information about the merchants’ operations.  
Fig. 2. Distribution of merchant quality levels 
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As shown in Fig. 2, the average review scores, 
votes and prices were 69.58, 11.73 and $23.44. The 
scores tended to be anchored, and the votes and pric-
es had a right-skewed distribution.  
To measure consumer purchasing behavior, we 
acquire anonymized transaction and customer data 
from a financial institution. Typical transaction in-
formation and descriptors were related to customer 
standing with the bank. Demographic data were also 
leveraged.  
3.3 Fuzzy Matching to Build the Dataset 
We used a fuzzy matching algorithm based on 
merchant name, address, phone number and zipcode 
to connect the multiple datasets. This way, we creat-
ed a unique dataset, which supports data analytics for 
deeper insights on the business strategies for banks in 
card partnerships. Table 1 suggests that banks gener-
ally partnered with popular merchants that created 
customer satisfaction. Bank I preferred the pricier 
merchants to attract affluent customers, while the 
other banks targeted lower-priced merchants.  
Table 1.  Merchant partner averages for 4 banks 
 BANK I BANK II BANK III BANK IV 
 Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean 
Score 72.0 69.8 60.5 54.0 67.0 63.24 72.5 69.4 
Votes 15.0 26.2 11.0 17.3 14.0 27.9 13.5 24.2 
Price 50.0 61.6 23.5 28.0 30.0 36.5 31.0 39.3 
Finally, the dataset we used for econometric anal-
ysis came to consist of 4,500+ merchants and 
400,000+ customers from September to December 
2015. See Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
VARIABLES # OBS MEAN SE MIN MAX 
Sales 15,860 12 ,852 41,304.52 0 1,296,929 
Cust 15,860 149.74 880.87 0 34,244 
Trans 15,860 189.93 1,466.07 0 58,636 
MerchTenure 15,860 17.34 8.93 0 27.30 
Score 7,677 48.24 14.90 0 70 
Votes 7,677 14.90 18.12 0.7 194 
Price 7,152 25.05 24.79 1.4 366.80 
Store 8,946 1.85 4.83 0.7 90.30 
Age 5,068,316 28.38 7.57 12.6 62.30 
Income 5,068,316 143,267.94 2,331,664 84.0 62,222,219 
Children 5,068,316 0.01 0.15 0 2.80 
CustTenure 5,068,316 85.20 59.50 0 496.30 
Notes. Merchant (Sales, Cust, Trans, MerchTenure) and customer data 
(Age, Income, Children, CustTenure) disguised with a multiplier, to 
protect the financial institution’s identity.  
4. Model and Methodology 
Our access to merchant and customer data al-
lowed estimation of two baseline models, which we 
will discuss next.  
4.1. Merchant-Level Model 
The merchant-level (j) model is: 
ln(Salesjt) = β0 + β1 PartnerBkjt + β2 PartnerCompjt  
+ β3 PartnerBkjt × PartnerCompjt  
+ β4 ln(Scorej) + β5 ln(Votesj) + β6 ln(Pricej) 
+ β7 Storesj + β8 MerchTenurejt + α Servicej  
+ γ Mechj + σ Zipj + δ Timet + εjt 
Here, ln(Salesjt), is the natural log of the sales of 
merchant j at month t. We also used the number of 
customers (Custjt) and transactions (Transjt) as alter-
nate measures. Market percentages (%Salesjt, %Cus-
tjt, %Transjt) are used for robustness checks.  
PartnerBkjt is binary, to indicate if merchant j had 
a card partnership with the bank at month t. To con-
trol for competing effects, merchant partnerships with 
rival banks (PartnerCompjt) were included, along 
with an interaction term to examine competitor credit 
card offer effectiveness. We used variables with mer-
chant information, and controlled for 3-digit zip 
code-level variation in merchant locations (Zipj) and 
time trends (Timet) too. εjt is an error term.  
4.2. Customer-Level Model 
We further developed a customer-level model that 
controls for individual differences, and examines the 
probability of a consumer i purchasing from a specif-
ic merchant using logistic regression:  
Pr(Purchaseijt) = β0 + β1 PartnerBkjt + β2 PartnerCompjt  
+ β3 PartnerBkjt × PartnerCompjt  
+ β4 ln(Scorej) + β5 ln(Votesj) + β6 ln(Pricej) 
+ β7 Storesj + β8 CustTenurejt + α Servicej  
+ γ Mechj + σ Zipj + ϕ Xit + δ Timet + µijt 
Purchaseijt is binary to indicate whether customer 
i purchased from merchant j in month t. The number 
of transactions (Transijt) is used to check robustness. 
Besides merchant-level controls, we included Xit, a 
set of individual variables regarding demographics 
and banking status. We controlled for customer age 
(Ageit), gender (Genderi), income (Incomei), marital 
status (Marriagei), education level (Educi), nationali-
ty (Nationalityi), and number of children (#Childre-
ni). We also included how long the customer was 
with the bank (CustTenurei), types of credit cards 
held (CardTypei), and whether the customer had past 
purchase experience with the merchant (Experiencei) 
to control for his standing with the bank.   
4.3. Regression Methods 
We applied negative binomial regression, Poisson 
regression, quantile regression, beta regression and 
logistic regression to deal with the different response 
variables in the two baseline models. 
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5. Main Findings of the Research  
We next present the estimation results of the mer-
chant-level and customer-level models.  
5.1. A Matched Merchant Sample 
We first used the full merchant dataset for model 
estimation, and the results showed significant and 
positive market responses to card promotions. 1 , 2 
There was endogeneity with merchant selection by 
the bank though. It had a strong preference to partner 
with merchants that had higher sales, higher price 
levels and more stores, as noted in our descriptive 
analysis in Table 4. This may have led to over-
estimated coefficients in the models. 
To address this issue, we matched the merchant 
partners with non-partners.3 Table 4 shows that the 
gaps for the different variables narrowed after match-
ing. Among the ratios we tried, 1:1 matching gave the 
best results with the closest numbers for the attributes 
between the partner and non-partner group. Thus, we 
re-estimated our baseline merchant level model using 
the 1-to-1 matched merchant sample. See Table 5. 
Consistent with the full merchant dataset findings, 
card promotions attracted 28.02% more consumers 
and increased transaction volume by 25.99%.4 There 
was no significant impact on merchant sales after 
                                                
1 We imputed values for missing data with averages for 
numeric variables and a “missing” indicator for categorical 
variables. We also used one sample without imputed values 
for missing data; and another where only missing values 
due to “No Review” from the aggregator was imputed. 
2 The coefficients for the output variables are βPartnerBk = 
0.592 for ln(Sales), βPartnerBk = 1.018 for Cust, and βPartnerBk 
= 1.001 for Trans; all with p < 0.01. The coefficients of 
PartnerComp were also positive (βComp = 0.217, p < 0.05 
for ln(Sales); βComp = 0.182, p < 0.01 for Cust; βComp = 
0.204, p < 0.01 for Trans), suggesting positive impact of 
card promotions from competitors. But, negative coeffi-
cients for the interaction term (βPartner x Comp = -0.553, p < 
0.10 for ln(Sales); βPartner x Comp = -0.416, p < 0.05 for Cust; 
βPartner x Comp = -0.345, p < 0.1 for Trans) mean that parallel 
promotions from competitors partially offset the effect on 
merchant performance with customers from the bank. 
3  We used propensity score matching based on average 
monthly values of: prior year sales, evaluated score, votes, 
price level, number of stores, and tenure with customers of 
the bank, together with service type, operating mechanism 
and location. The logit model is specified as Pr(PartnerBkj 
= 1) = f(ln(Salesj), ln(Scorej), ln(Votesj), ln(Pricej), Merch-
Tenurej, Servicej, Mechj, Zipj). 
4  The negative binomial models the log of the expected 
count as a function of the independent variables. The esti-
mated coefficients are interpreted as changes in log ex-
pected counts with a unit change in a variable. The 
change% = (ecoef – 1) × 100% = (e0.247 – 1) × 100% = 
28.02%. 
adjusting for endogenity though.  
Table 4. Results of merchant matching 
VARIABLES PARTNERS NON-PARTNERS 
MATCHED  
NON-
PARTNERS 
Sales 70,371  16,979  69,465  (-167,008)  (-41,476)  (-155,816)  
Score 61.73 69.19 61.68 (20.71) (22.47) (21.00) 
Votes 23.52 21.25 29.66 (22.62) (26.09) (32.28) 
Price 50.61 34.95 50.93 (72.38) (32.92) (55.41) 
Stores 10.50 2.37 9.59 (23.06) (5.52) (20.63) 
MerchTenure 21.25  18.04  21.04  (5.06) (8.06) (5.45) 
Obs. 64 2,212 64 
Notes. Std err. in parens. 1:1 matching ratio applied. 1:2, 1:5, and 
1:10 matches used for comparisons. Merchant (Sales, MerchTenure) 
disguised with a multiplier, to protect the identity of the financial 
institution from being disclosed. 
Table 5. Baseline merchant-level model results 
with matched merchant sample 
 ln(Sales) Cust Trans 
Intercept -6.653*** -5.799*** -5.828*** (1.719) (1.139) (1.159) 
PartnerBk -0.003 0.247** 0.231* (0.187) (0.119) (0.122) 
PartnerComp 0.462 0.077 0.059 (0.325) (0.194) (0.198) 
PartnerBk × 
PartnerComp 
-0.607 -0.200 -0.173 
(0.387) (0.235) (0.239) 
Notes. 508 obs.; std. err. in parens. OLS used for ln(Sales), neg. bin. 
used for Cust and Trans. Poisson model estimated for robustness. 
Control var. estimates suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 
0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
Why? Possibly due to cannibalization of merchant 
revenues from existing customers, when there are 
extra price discounts. Thus, the overall impact on 
sales depended on the tradeoff between the increase 
in quantities and the reduction in prices. Also, loyalty 
programs that discriminate against non-loyal custom-
ers may lead to their dissatisfaction, and hence 
switching to competitors [16].  
5.3. Baseline Customer-level Model Results 
The results of the customer-level and merchant-
level model were consistent. As Table 6 shows, card 
promotions resulted in a 62.8% increase in the bank’s 
customers’ likelihood to purchase. It also increased 
customer monthly transactions. Similar results re-
garding parallel promotions from competing banks 
were acquired for the customer-level model, suggest-
ing card promotions from competing banks offset the 
overall promotion effects of offers by the bank.  
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Table 6. Baseline customer-level model results 
 Purchase Trans 
Intercept -15.906 -25.771*** (16.314) (1.191) 
PartnerBk 0.628*** 0.638*** (0.032) (0.030) 
PartnerComp 0.105*** 0.075*** (0.027) (0.028) 
PartnerBk × 
PartnerComp 
-0.266*** -0.211*** 
(0.038) (0.038) 
Notes. 5,068,316 obs.; std. errs. in parens. Logit used for Pur-
chase; neg. bin. used for Trans. Poisson model estimated for ro-
bustness. Control var. estimates suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10; 
** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
5.4. Promotion Size Decomposition 
To examine the effects of different sizes and types 
of promotions, we decomposed the partnership indi-
cator into specific offers, for discounts, cash rebates, 
rewards and other promotion types (one-paid-one-
free, complementary goods, and report in Table 7.  
Table 7. Decomposition results for promotion size 
 MERCHANT-LEVEL CUSTOMER-LEVEL 
 ln(Sales) Cust Trans Purchase Trans 
Intercept -7.203*** -1.365 -16.333 -10.630*** -2.110* (1.831) (1.160) (16.243) (1.050) (1.187) 
PartnerBk:  
10% Disc 
-0.696*** -0.193 -0.439*** -0.313*** -0.154 
(0.265) (1.152) (0.106) (0.055) (0.156) 
PartnerBk:  
15% Disc 
0.455 0.857*** 0.214* 0.144* 0.740** 
(0.437) (0.291) (0.112) (0.079) (0.301) 
PartnerBk:  
20% Disc 
-0.112 0.176 0.565*** 0.664*** 0.074 
(0.610) (0.348) (0.102) (0.055) (0.358) 
PartnerBk:  
Rebate 
0.409 1.267*** 1.699*** 1.932*** 1.303*** 
(0.385) (0.250) (0.101) (0.046) (0.258) 
PartnerBk:  
Reward 
0.128 0.102 -0.132 -0.054 0.046 
(0.362) (0.220) (0.100) (0.048) (0.225) 
PartnerBk:  
Other  
0.648 0.426 0.948*** 1.005*** 0.393 
(0.499) (0.363) (0.127) (0.094) (0.385) 
Notes. 508 obs. for merchant model and 5,068,316 obs. for customer 
model; Disc = merchandise discount. Std. errs. in parens. OLS used 
for ln(Sales); neg. bin. used for Cust and Trans; logit used for Pur-
chase. Poisson model estimated for robustness. Control estimates 
suppressed. Signif. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
In price promotions, a 15% discount had the 
strongest impact on merchant sales, customer traffic 
and transactions (βPartnerBk = 0.937, p < 0.05 for 
ln(Sales); βPartnerBk = 1.067, p < 0.01 for Cust; βPart-
nerBk = 1.037, p < 0.01 for Trans). Lower or higher 
discounts showed weak or inverse effects. There was 
more market response to other promotion types, es-
pecially cash rebates than price discounts.  
5.5. Sales Stratification  
We stratified ln(Sales) in the merchant-level 
model using quantile regression. As shown in Fig. 5, 
the effects of card promotions were negative in the 
lower quantiles and became positive between the 
60th to 90th quantiles. The offset effect of parallel 
offers from competitors was lower above the 70th 
quantile, while it was largest between the 20th and 
65th quantiles. 
Fig. 5. Quantile regression results 
PartnerBk 
 
 
PartnerBk × PartnerComp 
 
 
5.6. Merchant and Customer Segmentation  
We conducted segment subsampling based on the 
medians of Score, Votes, Price, MechTenure and 
Stores, and estimated the merchant-level model using 
the subsamples. In Fig. 6, popular and pricier mer-
chants showed higher profitability and customer at-
traction capability. The coefficients of Score, 
MechTenure and Store were negative, though lower 
scores, higher tenure and stores were better off.  
Fig. 6. Merchant and customer segment results 
 
 
We looked into customer segments based on their 
average monthly spend in the targeted business sec-
tor, in all sectors, as well as the percentage, and show 
the between-groups results in Fig. 7. The results con-
sistently show that heavy spenders were less likely to 
react to credit card promotions, while the offers were 
more attractive to light spenders, probably due to 
different price sensitivities across customer groups. 
5.7. Robustness Checks  
We turned to shares of Sales, Cust, and Trans and 
used beta regression for robustness checks. The re-
sults in Table 8 are consistent with our earlier analy-
sis, providing additional support for our conclusions. 
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Table 8. Robustness estimation results 
 RELATIVE MARKET SHARES 
 %Sales %Cust %Trans 
Intercept -7.857*** -7.043*** -7.109*** (0.269) (0.292) (0.297) 
PartnerBk 0.078 0.208*** 0.223*** (0.051) (0.059) (0.059) 
PartnerComp 0.176** 0.157* 0.103 
(0.071) (0.080) (0.086) 
PartnerBk × 
PartnerComp 
-0.167* -0.146 -0.093 
(0.088) (0.098) (0.102) 
Notes. 508 obs. Std. errs. in parens. Beta regression used for 
%Sales, %Cust and %Trans; neg. bin. used for Trans; and logit 
used for Purchase. Poisson model estimated for robustness. 
Control var. estimates suppressed to save space. Signif. * = p < 
0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
6. Conclusion 
The proliferation of credit card products and card-
based programs has created opportunities for banks 
enhance profitability. This research investigated how 
consumer behavior and merchant performance may 
be affected by card-based programs. We contributed 
new knowledge for card marketing between banks 
and retailers. We also offered useful policy analytics 
ideas, and supports reconsideration of business policy 
in the card promotions domain. In addition, we deliv-
ered results that pave the way for decision support in 
banks to more deeply probe credit card customer re-
wards and loyalty program behavior.  
We leveraged machine-based big data techniques 
to acquire data from public domain and combine it 
with the proprietary data of a financial institution. In 
spite of this, we recognize several limitations. First, 
the merchant data we obtained from the online ag-
gregator was from a single time point. We were una-
ble to capture the changing quality attributes of the 
merchants in our model. Second, the card promotions 
drawn from bank websites tend to cover longer-term 
partnerships with retailers. Ad hoc offers, which were 
not displayed on the webpages, were not included. 
Third, techniques such as screen-scraping and data-
base harvesting did not allow us to obtain historical 
data. Thus, we were unable to conduct “within” com-
parisons for estimates of higher fidelity. Last, the 
business sector we focused on is just one among 
many others in which consumers use credit cards to 
purchase and acquire benefits. Such efforts offer new 
and useful insights on customer behavior for firms 
and organizations in many other sectors. 
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